

influence had to adopt this system. It must be remembered that Napoleon eventually held or enforced his system on all the coast-lines of Europe, except that of Spain and Turkey; but, as Bourrienne shows, the plan of giving licenses to break his own system was too lucrative to be resisted by him, or, still more, by his officers. For the working of the system in the occupied lands see *Deagnot*, tome ii. p. 42. Lafitte, the banker, told Savary it was a grand idea, but impracticable (*Savary*, tome v. p. 110). The Emperor Alexander is reported to have said, after visiting England in 1814, that he believed the system would have reduced England if it had lasted another year (*Salary*, tome iv. p. 345). The English, who claimed the right of blockading any coast with but little regard to the effectiveness of the blockade, retaliated by orders in Council, the chief of which are dated 7th January, 1807, and 11th November, 1807, by which no ships of any power were allowed to trade between any French ports or the ports of any country closed to England. Whatever the real merits of the system, and although it was the cause of war between the United States and England, its execution did most to alienate France and Napoléon, and to band all Europe against it. It is curious that even in 1831 a treaty had to be made to settle the claims of the United States on France for unjust seizures under these decrees; see Guizot's *Memoirs*, torn® iii. p. 233.